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hypothetical case in which the only evidence amassed against the
defendant is circumstantial 2 and the victim is unavailable to testify
and, in fact, has never made a sworn statement on record. To allow
a witness to testify as to what the absent victim told him, as much
as several hours after the incident concerning the details of the at-
tack, would be tantamount to trial of the defendant without fur-
nishing him his constitutionally guaranteed right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers. It is certainly not suggested that the
supreme court would knowingly sanction such an obvious travesty
of justice; however, it is submitted that to continue the sanctioning
of the type of evidence offered in the Hatcher case without any
meaningful inquiry into its necessity and trustworthiness is to set
the stage for this hypothetical travesty of justice to become a reali-
ty.
Estelle Mahoney
GULF STATES UTILITIES, THE PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION, AND THE SUPREME COURT: ON
RAISING THE ELECTRIC RATES
The Louisiana Public Service Commission denied a request by
Gulf States Utilities for an increase in its electric rates.' On appeal
from a district court judgment which had generally upheld the
Commission's denial,2 the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the
only issue is the consent of the victim of that rape evidence of other offenses is usually
inadmissible. Id. at 1034 n.1. The defendant was not convicted of the forcible rape
charge or of a lesser included offense, however, and the court viewed any prejudice
that the defendant might have suffered in his defense to that prosecution as "inconse-
quential." Id. at 1034.
62. For a thorough discussion of circumstantial evidence (i.e., all offered eviden-
tiary facts not being assertions from which the truth of the matter asserted is desired
to be inferred) as distinguished from testimonial evidence, see 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 25 (3d ed. 1940). See also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, at § 185.
1. Gulf States Utils. Co., 20 P.U.R. 4th 147 (La. P.S.C. 1977). The increase in
rates would have produced additional revenues of $23,750,000.
2. The district court had, however, granted an attrition adjustment. Attrition is
the tendency of a utility's rate of return to diminish because of rising expenses due to
inflation. Central Main Power Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 382 A.2d 302, 316 n.18 (Me.
1978). For a discussion of rate of return, see text at notes 3-7, infra. Utilities typically
present their rate requests to regulatory agencies using their most recent figures for
expenses, revenues, and valuation. See, e.g., New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Util., 354 N.E.2d 860, 865 (Mass. 1976). When the matter is finally con-
cluded a year or two later, the rate relief granted will inevitably produce a smaller
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Commission's order and held that the Commission did not act
unreasonably or arbitrarily (1) in using a rate formula which did not
allow Gulf States to pass on to consumers costs of certain
construction work in progress, and (2) in not allowing Gulf States to
"normalize" its income tax expenses in order to artificially inflate
the rate base. Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Louisiana Public Service
Commission, 364 So. 2d 1266 (La. 1978).
The regulation of public utility rates involves a balancing of in-
vestor and consumer interests. Although regulation is not meant to
guarantee revenues, the financial integrity of the business requires
that there be enough revenue to cover both the utility's operating
costs and its capital costs.' The return to the stockholder should be
commensurate with returns on investments in other businesses with
corresponding risks and should be sufficient to assure confidence in
the financial integrity of the utility so that it is able to maintain its
credit and attract capital.5 In order to regulate utility rates accor-
dingly, four separate factors are calculated:
1. The amount of revenues generated under the present rate
structure.
2. The operating expenses, including maintenance, deprecia-
tion, and taxes, incurred to produce revenues.
3. The rate base, i2e., the value of the property, plant, and
equipment (less accumulated depreciation) which provide the
service, and on which a return should be earned.
4. The rate of return, a percentage figure which, when applied
to the rate base, will generate revenues sufficient to cover
rate of return than intended, since it is based on figures which, though accurate when
recorded, have since been elevated by inflation. Of the methods devised by regulatory
agencies to deal with attrition, two seem to be the most effective and accurate. The
first indexes the rate of return to the inflation rate. As inflation rises, the rate of
return is permitted to rise accordingly. See West, Adjusting Rates to Cost of Capital,
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 15, 1977, at 19, 22. The second method deals with the problem
from the other end of the rate-making process: the rate base itself is indexed to the
economy. This is accomplished by adjusting the rate base to reflect replacement rather
than original cost of plant in service. See Spiro, Alternative Methods of Inflation Ad-
justment in Utility Rate Making, PUB. UTIL. FORT., March 2, 1978, at 30, 30-31. In the
instant case, the supreme court overturned the district court's attrition adjustment,
finding Gulf States' rate of return to be adequate without it. Gulf States Utils. Co. v.
Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 364 So. 2d 1266, 1274 (La. 1978). Dissenting Justice Sum-
mers agreed that the attrition adjustment request should be denied, 364 So. 2d at 1282
(Summers, J., dissenting). Since attrition exists only in relation to the rate of return,
as long as the rate of return is a fair one, no accommodation for attrition should be
made. The issue is not treated further in this note.
3. See, e.g., FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944) (dealing with
the federal rate-making process).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 603-05.
19801 1049
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [
costs and give investors a fair return on their investment.6
Algebraically, the rate of return is derived from the following
formula: R = 0 + (V-D)r, in which R represents the amount of revenue
deemed sufficient; 0, the operating expenses; (V-D), the rate base
(value less accumulated depreciation); and r, the rate of return.'
Once the values for these elements are determined, the public utili-
ty rates are then set in order to generate the required revenues. All
of these elements are variables; fluctuation of any one of them will
produce a concomitant change in the rates consumers pay. Thus, the
proper determination of these figures not infrequently is the subject
of controversy at rate hearings. Discussion of the instant case re-
quires an understanding of two factors involved in the valuation pro-
cess: construction work in progress (CWIP) and depreciation.
The treatment of CWIP is an often-argued bone of contention at
rate proceedings.8 Traditionally, regulatory agencies have required
that the rate base include only property "used and useful" in render-
ing the utility service.9 Under this principle, present consumers are
obliged to pay a rate of return only on the property that actually
provides the service. By definition, CWIP is not in service; hence,
rate-payers have not been required to pay for it, and the amount has
not been included in the rate base.'" Thus, utilities have not been
allowed to charge their customers for the capital costs associated
with replacement of plant being used up by consumers or expansion
necessitated by increased demand. To ameliorate the harshness of
this result, regulatory agencies have developed various methods of
treating CWIP.
A large number of jurisdictions employ the interest during con-
struction method (IDC)," according to which the amounts expended
6. 1 A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 45 (1969).
7. Id. at 139.
8. See, e.g., Goodman v. Public Serv. Comm'n of the Dist. of Columbia, 497 F.2d
661 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Alabama Power Co., 97 P.U.R.3d 371 (Ala. P.S.C. 1972); Municipali-
ty of Anchorage, 19 P.U.R. 4th 278 (Alas. P.U.C. 1977); Florida Gas Co., 13 P.U.R. 4th
255 (Fla. P.S.C. 1975); South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 15 P.U.R. 4th 391 (Miss. P.S.C. 1976);
Texas Power & Light Co., 20 P.U.R. 4th 243 (Tex. P.U.C. 1977).
9. See, e.g., Mystic Valley Water Co., P.U.R. 3d 23 (Conn. P.U.C. 1969); Boston
Edison Co., 6 P.U.R. 4th 77 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util. 1974); Union Elec. Co., 81 PU.R.3d
265 (Mo. P.S.C. 1969); Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico, 82 P.U.R.3d 362, 369 (N.M.
P.S.C. 1970); Catawba Water Supply, Inc., 94 P.U.R.3d 197 (N.C. Util. Comm'n 1972).
10. A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 174-75.
11. See, e.g., Georgia Power Co., 3 P.U.R. 4th 375 (Ga. P.S.C. 1973); New England
Tel. and Tel. Co., 100 P.U.R.3d 189, 193 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util. -1973); New England
Tel. and Tel. Co., 84 P.U.R.3d 130, 155 (Mass. Dep't Pub. Util. 1970); Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 8 P.U.R. 4th 75 (Minn. P.S.C. 1974); South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 5 P.U.R. 4th 113
(Miss. P.S.C. 1974); Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 2 P.U.R. 4th 312 (Neb. P.S.C. 1974);
New York Tel. Co., 2 P.U.R. 4th 1 (N.Y. P.S.C. 1973); Mountain States Tel. and Tel.
Co., 90 P.U.R.(n.s.) 107, 118 (Utah P.S.C. 1951); Central Vermont Pub. Serv. Corp., 94
1050 Vol. 40
19801 NOTES 1051
for CWIP are completely excluded from the rate base. A bookkeep-
ing entry' for the cost of capital is made, however; and, when the
plant does go into service, the rate base will include the total cost,
including the interest paid out for the capital while the plant was
being constructed.2
Allowance for funds used during construction (AFUDO) is a sec-
ond method by which regulatory agencies allow for CWIP in the
rate of return formula. 3  Under this approach, followed in
Louisiana," the utility is allowed to include its CWIP expenditures
in the rate base, but an offsetting adjustment is added to income. 5
Thus, the inclusion of CWIP in the rate base is fictional, not actual.
The net result is the same as with the IDC method: when the plant
goes into service, all costs, including interest, are reflected in the
rate base in order that the investors may recoup their entire invest-
ment." As in the instant case, utility companies often argue for in-
P.U.R.3d 34 (Vt. Pub. Serv. Bd. 1972).
12. See Communications Satellite Corp., 56 F.C.C.2d 1101, 1132 (1975).
13. A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 179. See, e.g., Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co, 98
P.U.R.(n.s.) 511 (Ky. P.S.C. 1953); Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 85 P.U.R.3d 467, 473-74 (Mich.
P.S.C. 1970); Detroit Edison Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 463, 469 (Mich. P.S.C. 1971); North
Carolina ex rel. Utils. Comm'n v. Morgan, 277 N.C. 273, 177 S.E.2d 405, 416-17 (N.C.
1970).
14.. 364 So. 2d 1266, 1270 (La. 1978).
15. Although the rate base is inflated by the CWIP amounts, the utility's income
figure is increased artificially by a corresponding amount sufficient to offset the effect
of the rate base increase, with the result that the revenue required by the utility is
not affected by the mathematical adjustments. A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 179.
16. An illustration may be helpful here. Assume Utility X has current plant in
service valued at $1,000,000, CWIP is valued at $100,000, its current revenues are
zero, and the rate of return deemed to be fair is 10%.
Under the IDC method, the revenue requirement would be $100,000, computed as
follows:
Rate base Fair rate of return Revenue requirement
$1,000,000 10% $100,000
($100,000 CWIP
excluded)
Under the AFUDC method, the computation looks like this:
Rate base Fair rate of return Revenue requirement
Plant in service
$1,000,000
CWIP 100,000
TOTAL $1,100,000 10% $110,000
The final revenue requirement is still only $100,000, however, because of the offset-
ting addition to income which must be made:
Revenue requirement $110,000
less "income" due to AFUDC: -10,000 (computed at 10/o of CWIP)
Final Revenue Requirement $100,000
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clusion of CWIP in the rate base without a corresponding offset to
income in an attempt to charge current rate-payers for the construc-
tion of facilities not yet in service."
Depreciation of plant and equipment in relation to the rate base
is another frequently litigated source of controversy."8 Under the In-
ternal Revenue Code, businesses have the option to deduct as
depreciation expense for the earlier years of an asset an amount
greater than that otherwise allowed them for depreciation of
assets."5 This process, known as accelerated depreciation, results in
a lower tax liability for those years. If the same artificially high
level of depreciation is used in rate proceedings for calculating the
value of the rate base, the rate base will, to that same extent, be ar-
tificially low. Desiring the highest possible rate base upon which to
determine the rate of return, utilities traditionally argue for "nor-
malization" of the depreciation expense." Normalization is the prac-
tice of using accelerated depreciation for income tax purposes and
straight-line (i.e., normal, or pro rata) depreciation for rate-making
purposes."1 In this way, the utilities receive the benefit of lower in-
come taxes resulting from the accelerated depreciation, but con-
versely calculate their rate base on a pro rata level of depreciation.
Thus, the utility rates are higher than would be the case if ac-
celerated depreciation were used for rate-making purposes.
However, regulatory agencies often require "flow-through" of
the tax benefits to the rate-paying consumers. 2 This procedure en-
17. See, e.g., Public Serv. Co. of Colorado, 13 P.U.R. 4th 40, 52 (Colo. P.U.C. 1975);
Hartford Elec. Light Co., 6 P.U.R. 4th 209, 230 (Conn. P.U.C. 1974); Iowa Power and
Light Co., 20 P.U.R. 4th 397, 401 (Iowa St. Commerce Comm'n 1977).
18. See, e.g., Belvedere Water Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 202, 203 (Fla. P.S.C. 1970); Wiscon-
sin Pub. Serv. Corp., 83 P.U.R.3d 301 (Mich. P.S.C. 1970); Northland Util. Ltd., 85
P.U.R.3d 432, 439-40 (Alta. Pub. Utils. Bd. 1970) (Can.).
19. I.R.C. § 167. Thus, if the plant has a useful life of ten years, with accelerated
depreciation the utility can depreciate the plant for income tax purposes approximate-
ly 15% the first year, with the amount of depreciation decreasing each year so that in
the tenth year only about 3.5%/ depreciation is taken. See I.R.C. § 167(j)(1)(B). Under
straight-line, or normal, depreciation, the asset, less salvage value, is depreciated an
equal amount (10%) each year.
20. See, e.g., FPC v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div'n, 411 U.S. 458 (1973);
Iowa Power and Light Co., 20 P.U.R. 4th 397, 406-07 (Iowa St. Commerce Comm'n
1977); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 390 A.2d 8, 18-19 (Me.
1978).
21. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 390 A.2d 8, 18-19 n.4
(Me. 1978).
22. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 52 P.U.R.3d 118 (F.P.C. 1964); Cincinnati
Gas and Elec. Co., 35 P.U.R.3d 392, 397 (Ohio P.U.C. 1960). The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit is among those courts approving flow-through. Alabama-Tennessee
Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 847 (1966). For a
general discussion of flow-through and normalization, see A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at
124-38.
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tails the passing on to the consumers of the benefits of accelerated
depreciation in the form of reduced rates." The rationale behind the
flow-through mechanism is that to allow "normalized" depreciation
in the rate base is to give deference to fiction over fact. If the utility
actually pays only a small amount of taxes by taking a large chunk
of depreciation expense, to allow it to reduce its rate base by a
lower "normal" depreciation percentage will in effect charge present
consumers for taxes not really paid by the utility. 4
The reasonableness of the Public Service Commission's2" denial
of a request for a rate increase was before the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Louisiana Public Service Com-
mission.6 At the outset, the court delineated the standard of review
applicable to appeals from the decisions of the Commission: the
question is always whether the Commission acted unreasonably or
arbitrarily in establishing the rates. Relevant to this inquiry is the
question of whether the total effect of the order is unjust or
unreasonable.27 Additionally, the court observed that the decisions of
the Commission carry a presumption of validity and the opponent of
the order bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise.28
Gulf States, in attempting to persuade the court that its rate of
return was too low, argued that: (1) expenditures for certain pollu-
tion control and fuel-conversion equipment under construction
should have been added into the rate base without adding a cor-
23. A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 124.
24. See Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318, 336 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 847 (1966).
25. The Louisiana Public Service Commission (P.S.C.) is an administrative agency
vested with broad discretionary powers. It is unclear whether the P.S.C. is subject to
the state Administrative Procedure Act (A.P.A.), LA. R.S. 49:951-68 (Supp. 1966 &
1978). Compare LA. R.S. 49:967 (Supp. 1974 & 1978), with LA. R.S. 49:968(F)(4) (Supp.
1966). If applicable, the A.P.A. would provide different appellate procedure and a
different standard of review than set forth under the statutory and constitutional pro-
visions which provide for the working of the P.S.C. See Louisiana Consumers' League
v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 351 So. 2d 128 (La. 1977) (rule-making provisions of
A.P.A. held not applicable to P.S.C.). But see Karr6, Louisiana's "New" Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 35 LA. L. REV. 629, 636 (1975) (arguing P.S.C. could claim
exemption from A.P.A. on state constitutional grounds).
The power to fix just and reasonable rates is delegated to the Commission in the
state constitution as well as by statute. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 21(B); LA. R.S. 45:1176
(1950).
26. 364 So. 2d 1266 (La. 1978).
27. Id. at 1267-68. See also FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944);
South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 352 So. 2d 964 (La. 1977);
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 343 So. 2d 1040 (La.
1977); Baton Rouge Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 342 So. 2d 609
(La.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827, (1977).
28. 364 So. 2d at 1267-68.
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responding AFUDC offset to income, because this equipment would
benefit present as well as future consumers;29 (2) accelerated
depreciation should have been normalized to reflect a larger rate
base;"° and (3) the "end result" of the rate increase denial would be a
cash-flow crisis for the company, leaving it with revenues insuffi-
cient to maintain financial integrity and attract the capital
necessary for fuel-conversion and pollution control construction. 1
Labelling both the depreciation and CWIP issues as matters of
policy, the court held that the Commission did not act unreasonably
or arbitrarily in refusing to normalize the depreciation and in refus-
ing to pass the cost of pollution and fuel-conversion construction on
to present rate-payers.2 Unconvinced that Gulf States would suffer
any significant financial detriment without the rate increase, the
court dismissed the end result argument as well, noting that the
company still enjoyed a high (AA) bond rating and that the 13.84%
return allowed on equity was quite sufficient."
Traditional regulatory policy supports the Commission's decision
not to allow any inclusion in the rate base for CWIP without a cor-
responding AFUDC adjustment to income. Justice Tate, writing for
the majority, quoted the following passage from the Commission's
order:
"The question . . . is philosophical in nature: should a
present-day rate-payer be required to pay for all or part of the
capital costs associated with a plant not used or useful to him..
. ? [I]t is appropriate to adhere to the accepted regulatory princi-
ple that rate-payers should pay only for that plant which
presently benefits them.."4
But the problem of CWIP is not merely philosophical, nor so
simple as to be resolved by the armchair assertion that rate-payers
should pay only for that plant in service which benefits them. This
principle of matching existing rate-payers with existing services is
based on the assumption, arguably erroneous, that present energy
consumers are as a group identifiably distinct from those who will
use energy five or ten years from now. The weakness of this
assumption is apparent. Energy consumption is a lifelong process.
To deny utilities the right to charge consumers for plant not yet in
29. Id. at 1280.
30. Id. at 1269.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1271.
33. Id. at 1273.
34. Id. at 1271.
35. Johnson, CWIP: Planning For The Rate Case, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 2, 1979,
at 15, 20.
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service based on the premise that they receive no benefit from the
plant is unrealistic, since these same rate-payers will derive their
energy from the plant and pay for it when it comes on line." Fur-
thermore, this matching principle is not as sacrosanct as the
regulators imply; it is not adhered to throughout the regulatory pro-
cess. A glaring example of its inconsistent application is seen in the
treatment of tax benefits. Regulatory commissions allow utilities to
lower their taxes by taking interest deductions on their CWIP
capital expenditures. The result is lower taxes while construction
work in progress (CWIP) is going on, and thus lower rates for the
present consumers. Future consumers who must pay for the full
CWIP expense do not get the interest deduction benefit, although
theoretically the money was borrowed, and the plant built, to satisfy
their needs. 7
Additionally, the impact of the AFUDC method on the utility's
financial integrity should be examined. Inclusion of CWIP in the
rate base with an offsetting adjustment to income results in a cash-
flow problem for the utility and presents a false picture of its earn-
ings as well. Once complacently accepted when construction costs
were low and the time required for construction short, AFUDC is to-
day being questioned before regulatory agencies with increasing fer-
vor as costs soar and the time necessary for new plant construction
perenially increases." The AFUDC adjustment to income now com-
prises 40% of earnings for the.average utility in those states which
use the AFUDC method, and is up to 70% for some. " This high
percentage of AFUDC in earnings presents a distorted picture of
the utility's financial health, because the AFUDC amount is not real
dollars available for capital costs or dividend payments, but rather
only a bookkeeping entry representing a future privilege to charge
rate-payers for the CWIP. Analysts agree that there is an inverse
relationship between the percentage of AFUDC and the financial
health of the utility.'0
36. Consumers fall into two groups: (1) industry, which theoretically enjoys
perpetual existence, and (2) individuals. Those individuals who die before the plant is
in service will generally be succeeded in their electricity consumption by their descen-
dants. Id.
37. -See Coughlan, Allowance for Funds in Construction Accounting Stepchild
and Regulatory Football, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 4, 1976, at 26, 30.
38,. Today, the investment in CWIP equals about 20% of utilities' total net plant.
Why There Will Be a Money Crunch, Bus. WEEK, May 28, 1979, at 111, 120
[hereinafter cited as Money Crunch]. The lead time for a nuclear plant is now about
twelve years; for a coal plant, eight years. A Dark Future for Utilities, Bus. WEEK,
May 28, 1979, at 108, 111 [hereinafter cited as Dark Future].
39. Money Crunch, supra note 38, at 120 & 124.
40. See Mattutat, A Pragmatic Approach to Construction Work in Progress, PUB.
UTIL. FORT., March 3, 1977, at 31, 37; Trout, A Rationale for Preferring Construction
Work in Progress in the Rate Base, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 10, 1979, at 22, 23.
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Although theoretically proper according to accounting principles
(the utility will eventually recover its costs of capital when the plant
goes into service), use of the AFUDC method presents serious cash-
flow problems for the electric utility with a large percentage of
AFUDC income in its earnings.' Most of the capital needed for utili-
ty construction must be acquired externally."2 Unable to include
CWIP in the rate base without a corresponding adjustment to in-
come, the utilities cannot earn a return on their construction invest-
ment until the plant goes into service. Hence, the cost of borrowing
the construction capital must come from some source other than the
rate-payers. Utilities often turn to the bond market to meet these
capital needs, but rising AFUDC figures cast an increasingly longer
shadow on their ability to borrow money there."3 Utilities with a
large proportion of AFUDC in their earnings are perceived by in-
vestors as less than financially healthy, and the bond ratings of
these utilities subsequently suffer." As investors are being advised
to trim utility holdings from their portfolios," meeting these capital
costs during the years that new plant is being constructed presents
utilities with an increasingly severe financial predicament; this
predicament is not adequately accounted for in present rate-making
procedures.
Finally, it should be observed that inclusion of CWIP in the rate
base would result in more gradual rate increases for consumers." At
the heart of the CWIP problem lies the use of original cost in the
rate base. In most jurisdictions, as in Louisiana, regulatory commis-
sions calculate the value of the plant in service in the rate base at
its original cost.4" Theoretically, as the plant depreciates each year,
the amount of the depreciation is set aside in a depreciation reserve
account in order to provide a source of funds to replace the plant as
it becomes obsolete. 8 Since the plant is figured into the rate base at
its original cost, as opposed to the present-day cost of replacing the
41. Gulf States advanced this cash-flow argument in support of its position. 364
So. 2d at 1269.
42. The figure quoted currently is 60%. Money Crunch, supra note 38, at 111.
43. See Fitzpatrick & Stitzel, Capitalizing an Allowance for Funds Used During
Construction: The Impact on Earnings Quality, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 19, 1978, at 18,
19.
44. Money Crunch, supra note 38, at 124.
45. Id. at 114.
46. Mattutat, supra note 40, at 37.
47. CLARK, DODGE & Co., AN OUTLINE OF ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION BY STATES
40 (1965); A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 141.
48. A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 112-13 & 118-19.
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plant, the depreciation reserve"9 is necessarily limited to the original
cost as well.
This regulatory practice is premised upon the unrealistic
assumption that an original cost depreciation reserve will adequate-
ly finance a new plant.0 In reality, today's energy consumers are us-
ing up the useful life of energy plants while paying rates based upon
the original cost of these plants. Once the plant becomes obsolete, it
must be replaced; the depreciation reserve left behind is woefully in-
adequate for the purpose. The result is that utilities must find large
amounts of outside capital to build new plants in order to replace
the old which is being depleted through the use of present con-
sumers; this outside capital must be forthcoming if the utility is
merely to "stay even." 5'
Combining original cost figures with the exclusion of CWIP from
the rate base results in a sudden and large stair-step rate increase
when the new plant goes into service. Rates are kept artificially
low5" until the plant actually produces electricity, at which time the
utility is finally allowed to recover its costs. At this time, rates
jump up to reflect the true cost of the electricity. It is submitted
that use of replacement cost,53 coupled with inclusion of CWIP in the
rate base," would produce a more gradual rate increase curve. Thus,
the increase in consumers' rates would closely parallel the cost to
the utility, and the utility would be better able financially to under-
49. The. depreciation reserve is a bookkeeping account into which the amount of
depreciation taken annually is accrued. This depreciation reserve account is
represented by D in the rate-making equation found in the text at note 7, supra.
50. The average capital cost per kilowatt hour of a coal-fired plant has risen from
$144 in 1970 to $1096 for one scheduled to go on line in 1987. For nuclear plants, the
corresponding figures are $165 and $1861. Dark Future, supra note 38, at 109.
51. See Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico, 8 P.U.R. 4th 113, 118 (N.M. P.S.C. 1975).
52. The rates are artificial in the sense that the rates in effect before a new plant
goes into service (based as they are on the original cost of the present obsolete plant,
without any consideration for the new plant under construction) do not reflect the true
cost of the electricity provided. This is analogous to the low prices paid for gasoline
under regulation; the price paid does not reflect the true market cost, ie., the price
that would obtain absent the regulation.
53. Replacement cost is being considered elsewhere in varying degrees. See, e.g.,
Mebane Home Tel. Co., 19 P.U.R. 4th 290 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1977); Piedmont Natural
Gas Co., 18 P.U.R. 4th 478 (N.C. Utils. Comm'n 1977).
54. About ten states allow CWIP in full in their rate base, and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission now allows it as well in certain instances. FPC Order
No. 555, 41 Fed. Reg. 51,392 (1976); Money Crunch, supra note 38, at 120. Approximate-
ly one-half of the states permit CWIP to some degree in the rate base. FPC Order No.
555, 41 Fed. Reg. 51,392 (1976), citing NAT'L ASS'N OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMM'RS,
1974 ANNUAL REPORT ON UTILITY AND CARRIER REGULATION 391-92 (1976).
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take construction necessary to adequately meet present and future
energy demands.
The court in the instant case took little notice of these problems
inherent in the traditional treatment of CWIP, choosing instead to
defer faithfully to the judgment of the Public Service Commission.
Inasmuch as the Commission is an elected body,55 and therefore
arguably more easily influenced by political pressures and aspira-
tions, it is especially important that the court upon review examine
the Commission's order with something more than a deferential at-
titude. It is submitted that, rather than blindly following the ine-
quitable and illogical matching principle, the regulators and the
courts should instead consider whether the investment is a prudent
one; i.e., is it necessary to insure adequate supplies of electricity to
meet reasonably expected future demands? 6 If so, the cost of the
construction should be included in the rate base." The problems in-
herent in the AFUDC method would thus be eliminated.
The arguments in favor of including CWIP in the rate base are
especially persuasive in the context of the instant case. Gulf States
contended for actual inclusion (i.e., without offset) in the rate base of
CWIP amounts expended for pollution control and fuel conversion. 8
Arguably, this request was very reasonable. Required by the federal
government, this equipment for pollution control will benefit all area
residents, whether or not customers of Gulf States. As for the fuel
conversion construction, it should be noted that the Powerplant and
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978"9 mandates that there be no con-
struction of natural gas or oil-fired plants after 1980, and that such
already existing facilities be converted to accept other fuels by 1990.
55. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 21. It has been noticed elsewhere that unresponsive com-
missions are often run by elected officials whose reelection hinges on their ability to
keep voters' electric bills down. The Regulatory Factor in Buying Stocks, Bus. WEEK,
May 28, 1979, at 114.
56. Since a large portion of Gulf States' CWIP is devoted to the construction of
the River Bend nuclear plant, some readers may view the plea for actual inclusion of
CWIP in the rate base as an affirmation of the use of nuclear power. No such indorse-
ment is intended. According to the approach advocated for dealing with CWIP, the
prudent investment inquiry would necessarily entail a socially responsible decision as
to the wisdom of nuclear power investment.
57. This "prudent investment" inquiry is almost universally recognized in a
similar area of rate regulation. Telephone companies have long been allowed a return
on equipment investment which, although not presently used, is reasonably expected
to be necessary in the foreseeable future. Thus, it has been held that a 115 kilovolt line
could be properly included in the rate base, although it was only then being used at a
48 kilovolt level. Latourneau v. Citizens Utils. Co., 125 Vt. 38, 44-45, 209 A.2d 307, 313
(1965).
58. 364 So. 2d at 1270 & 1280.
59. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8301-483 (1978).
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The essence of the Act is that all electric utilities will have to con-
vert to some other alternate fuel (e.g., coal or nuclear power) in the
near future. Each of these requires substantial cash outlays. In addi-
tion to the arguments discussed above for inclusion of CWIP in the
rate base, a strong argument can be made that whenever a
regulated utility is required by law to undertake construction, the
utility should likewise be able to charge its rate-payers for the
capital costs associated with that construction. The matching princi-
ple is inconsistsent with this rationale. All rate-payers, present and
future, are benefited by pollution control and conversion modifica-
tions. Significantly, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission now
allows inclusion in the rate base of CWIP which is necessitated by
pollution control or fuel-conversion requirements imposed upon in-
dustries that it regulates, on the premise that "the profligacy of the
present generation ...requires the new facilities."6
As for the issue of the normalization of the utility's depreciation
expense, the lines are not as sharply drawn. Sound opposing policies
compete for recognition. Accelerated depreciation came into being
as an incentive to enter business and invest on the theory that a
business in its early years is more likely to survive if given a tax
break. Investment in new equipment is spurred by the knowledge
that a great part of the outlay can be "written off" in the first few
years. The economy is stimulated, and the government will recover
its share in the later years of "lean" depreciation.'
The utilities argue forcefully that these purposes for allowing
accelerated depreciation in income tax accounting are thwarted by
the flow-through requirement. If the plant value in the rate base is
likewise depreciated liberally for rate-making purposes, the argu-
ment goes, the revenues allowed will thus be lowered as well, and
the tax "break" will be no break at all for the utilities"2-they take
accelerated depreciation only to end up with correspondingly lower
revenues.
The argument at first blush appears persuasive, but closer ex-
amination reveals that it assumes too much. The flawed assumption
is that Congress intended to benefit regulated utilities as well as
private enterprise with its liberalized depreciation legislation. 3
60. FPC Order No. 555, 41 Fed. Reg. 51,392, 51,394 (1976).
61. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 11954] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4048; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in
[1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4621, 4656.
62. Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co., 52 P.U.R.3d 118, 122 (F.P.C. 1964); City
of Alton v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 76, 89-90, 165 N.E.2d 513, 521 (1960).
63. A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 124-25.
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Arguably, the tax advantages of accelerated depreciation are not
needed by a public utility whose rates and profits are practically in-
sured by government regulation, restrictive entry, and, hence, in-
sulation from competition. Rather, the depreciation legislation
should serve the new business person, for whom the financial risk
inherent in the free enterprise system is a reality.
A further policy consideration is the likelihood that these de-
ferred taxes will never actually be paid if the utility is either
economically stable or growing." The heart of the utilities' argument
is that treatment of deferred taxes is merely a matter of timing.
Thus, to use straight-line depreciation for rate-making purposes is
appropriate, since the taxes that are deferred because of the
liberalized depreciation laws will be paid in those years of "lean"
depreciation ahead. As the court recognized, this proposition is valid
only if the individual assets upon which accelerated depreciation is
taken are retained until fully depreciated.6 With a stable or growing
company, however, assets are usually replaced before the lean years
of depreciation arrive; the new asset is depreciated as liberally as
possible, and the cycle goes ever on. The result is that the taxes are
not deferred, but are actually avoided." To allow a "normalization"
increase in a stable company's rate base on the assumption that
these taxes will be paid in the future is a delusion at best and con-
scious ignorance at worst. The result is that consumers compensate
the utility for expenses which are never actually incurred.6
Gulf States also contended that the "end result" of the denial of
their rate increase request would be to leave them in a precarious
64. 364 So. 2d at 1275-76 app. 1; A. PRIEST, supra note 6, at 125; Davidson, Ac-
celerated Depreciation and the Allocation of Income Taxes, 33 ACCOUNTING REV. 173,
179-80 (1958).
65. The assertion is that, after the total depreciation period is over, the same
amount of taxes will have been paid, regardless of the method of depreciation used.
364 So. 2d at 1275-76 app. 1.
66. Id.
67. See Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359 F.2d 318, 336 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 847 (1966).
68. According to figures compiled by the P.S.C., in the last twenty-five years, the
"reserve" set aside by Gulf States which represents the income taxes "deferred" has
increased annually, from $737,000 in 1954 to $103,718,000 in 1977. In its 1977 taxes,
Gulf States enjoyed a net income of more than $65,000,000, deferred tax savings of
$13,424,000, and paid federal income taxes exclusive of capital gains tax, of only
$3,290,000. Brief for Appellee at 20, Gulf States Util. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 364 So. 2d 1266 (La. 1978). Imprudent overinvestment may be a further result
of deferred payment of taxes. According to the Averch-Johnson hypothesis, an
overgenerous rate of return induces regulated companies to overinvest in capital
assets. Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM.
ECON. REv. 1052 (1962). See D. BOIES & P. VERKUIL, PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS 146 &
192 (1977).
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financial position, unable to attract capital or maintain their finan-
cial integrity. The utility pointed to certain indicia as evidence of
this contention, including the fact that the company had had to bor-
row money in order to pay dividends.89 The court countered this
argument with the observation that borrowing money is a routine
business transaction undertaken in order to raise capital to meet
various costs, including not only the payment of dividends, but
wages and other expenses as well. 0 Pointing out that Gulf States
still enjoyed an AA bond rating and that the company would earn a
13.84% return on equity without the rate increase, the court
dismissed the end result argument." Although the court's assess-
ment of the situation in the instant case may be correct, it is submit-
ted that continued refusal to allow earnings, on CWIP will bring
about the financial crisis Gulf States portrayed.
The United States has for several years been experiencing an
economy of inflationary spirals and a dwindling of energy resources,
and there are no indications that either of these trends will reverse
in the foreseeable future. Unlike free enterprises, regulated in-
dustries are unable to respond naturally to the laws of supply and
demand in order to weather the storm. Their economic viability
rests with the regulatory agencies; a faithful discharge of the agen-
cies duties requires realistic recognition of these trends. Once
adopted, this realistic viewpoint will surely entail a reassessment of
the traditional treatment of CWIP.
James Winston Pierce, Jr.
ABROGATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NONDISCRIMINATION- THE
ADVENT OF VOLUNTARY, RACE-DEPENDENT, PREFERENTIAL
TREATMENT IN EMPLOYMENT
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement,' the Gramercy,
Louisiana plant of Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation insti-
69. 364 So. 2d at 1272.
70. Id. at 1273.
71. Id.
1. Effective on February 1, 1974, the master collective bargaining agreement
entered into by the United Steelworkers of America and Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical
Corporation included an affirmative action plan designed to eliminate conspicuous
racial imbalances then present in Kaiser's almost exclusively white craft work forces.
The plan removed the requirement of prior craft experience for on-the-job training and
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